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Introduction
In a seminal paper, Singh and Vives (1984) show that Bertrand competition yields higher social welfare than Cournot competition if the goods are substitutes and the input markets are competitive. In a recent paper, Alipranti et al. (2014) show that when a monopoly input supplier bargains with the downstream firms over a two-part tariff vertical pricing contract, the upstream firm subsidises the quantity setting downstream firms via negative wholesale input prices. This creates higher social welfare under Cournot competition compared to Bertrand competition.
We believe that the assumption of a negative input price is not economically viable as it will encourage the downstream firms to buy an unbounded amount of inputs since the upstream firm would pay the downstream firms for each unit of input they purchase. We, therefore, impose a non-negativity constraint on the input prices. In contrast to Alipranti et al. (2014) , we show that if the upstream firm's marginal cost of production is low, Cournot competition may yield lower output level, lower consumer surplus and lower social welfare compared to Bertrand competition, thus supporting the findings of Singh and Vives (1984) even in a vertical structure.
The model and the results
We consider an economy similar to Alipranti et al. (2014) where two downstream firms, denoted by Di, produce differentiated products, ݅ , ݆= 1, 2 ; ݅≠ ݆. The downstream firms require a critical input for production that they purchase from a monopoly input supplier, U, through two-part tariff contracts involving an up-front fixed-fee, i F and a per-unit price, i w , 1, 2 i  . As in Alipranti et al. (2014) , we assume that U produces the input at a constant marginal cost of production. While Alipranti et al. (2014) assumed that the upstream firm produces at zero marginal cost, we generalise it by assuming that the marginal cost of the upstream firm is c, where ܿ ∈ (0, ܽ). This generalisation helps us to show that the negative input price in Alipranti et al. (2014) is not an artefact of their assumption of zero marginal cost of the upstream firm. We assume that the production technologies of the downstream firms are such that one unit of input is required to produce one unit of the output, and ‫ܦ‬ and ‫ܦ‬ can convert the inputs to the final goods without incurring any further cost.
We consider the following game. First, we will offer a general analysis of our model by using the reduced form expressions for outputs, price and profits, thus ignoring any specific demand function. We will then use a demand function similar to Alipranti et al. (2014) 
At stage 1, the terms of the two-part tariff contract for Di are determined by maximising the following generalised Nash bargaining expression:
where upstream firm's disagreement pay-off is ݀൫‫ݓ‬
Maximising (1) with respect to ‫ܨ‬ ఘ gives the following:
Substituting (2) in (1), we get the maximisation problem as:
Solving the first order condition gives the equilibrium input price
As in Alipranti et al. (2014) 
Cournot competition
First, consider the case where the final goods producers compete in quantities. At stage 2, i D ,
F is sunk at stage 2. The equilibrium output of the ith downstream firm can be found as
The gross equilibrium profit of the ith downstream firm is
Maximising (3) subject to (5) and (6) gives the equilibrium per-unit input price as
The following lemma follows immediately from the equilibrium input price.
Lemma 1:
The equilibrium input price is negative, i.e., ‫ݓ‬ < 0 for 0 < ܿ ≤ ܿ * and it is positive, i.e., ‫ݓ‬ > 0 for ܿ * < ܿ < ܽ where
As shown, the negotiated wholesale input price becomes negative when the upstream firm's marginal cost of production is low, i.e., 0 < ܿ ≤ ܿ * . According to Alipranti et al. (2014) , in this case, the monopoly input supplier subsidises downstream firms' production via input prices. However, as alluded earlier if the input price is negative, the downstream firms will want to buy an infinite number of inputs knowing that the upstream firm would pay the downstream firms for each unit of input they purchase. Hence, the assumption of a negative input price is not economically viable. Therefore, to make the analysis meaningful, we set .
Given the above-mentioned equilibrium input prices, we report the equilibrium outcomes in Table 1 .
Table 1
For
Bertrand competition
We now turn our analysis to the case where the firms compete in prices. The ith downstream
ቁ , where ݅= 1,2 . The equilibrium price and output of the ith downstream firm can be found as
Maximising (3) subject to (7) and (8) gives the equilibrium per-unit input price and the fixedfee as
We also calculate the following equilibrium values:
.
Results
Having derived the equilibrium outcomes under Cournot and Bertrand competition respectively, we now summarise our main results below. First, we take up the case where the upstream firm's marginal cost of input production is low, i.e., 0 < ܿ ≤ ܿ * (see propositions 1-3) and next, we consider the case where it is high, i.e., ܿ * < ܿ < ܽ (see proposition 4). where
As follows from Proposition 2, a lower (higher) output and higher (lower) prices of the final goods under Cournot competition result in lower (higher) consumer surplus under
Cournot competition compared to Bertrand competition for
Further, we show that Bertrand competition is socially desirable than Cournot
In this case, the loss in consumer surplus and upstream profit under
Cournot competition compared to Bertrand competition outweighs the gains in downstream profits 1 , thus creating an overall welfare loss under Cournot compared to Bertrand competition.
However, if ܿis relatively high i.e., ܿ ′′ < ܿ ≤ ܿ * , Cournot competition becomes more efficient than Bertrand competition (follows from proposition 2). In this case, the gains in consumer surplus and downstream profit outweigh the loss in upstream profit under Cournot competition compared to Bertrand competition, and create higher social welfare under the former case than the latter.
Next, we return to the case where ܿ * < ܿ < ܽ. To save the analytical repetition, we only report the results in the following proposition that are similar to Alipranti et al. (2014) .
1 As in Alipranti et al. (2014) we also get that ܷߨ − ܷߨ < 0 and ‫ߨܦ‬ − ‫ߨܦ‬ > 0 for 0 < ܿ ≤ ܿ * . The reasoning is straightforward. The input price being lower under Cournot than Bertrand competition, the upstream firm earns lower profit and downstream firms make higher profit in the former case than the latter. Alipranti et al. (2014) show that if a monopoly input supplier bargains with the final goods producers over a two-part tariff pricing contract to negotiate the input price, the upstream firm subsidises the quantity setting downstream firms' production via negative input prices, and Cournot competition generates higher welfare level than Bertrand competition. However, the assumption of negative input prices is not justifiable as it will encourage the downstream firms to buy an unbounded amount of inputs knowing that the upstream firm pays the downstream
Conclusion

